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On February 11, 1990 a captivated world watched as Nelson Mandela, at the time the world’s 
longest-serving political prisoner and a preeminent symbol of human rights repression, walked 
out of a South African prison after 27 years of captivity. Less than four years later, in April 1994, 
South Africans of all racial, political, and socioeconomic backgrounds went to the polls by the 
millions to elect Mandela as their president, in the country’s first ever democratic election. With 
this election the system of apartheid—one of the most highly institutionalized systems of 
segregation known to humankind—was brought to a resounding end. The forty-five years of 
apartheid rule (along with the over three hundred years of segregation that preceded it) were 
accompanied by human rights abuses that were similarly unparalleled.  With its collapse came 
the hope, and indeed the expectation, by South Africans and the world alike, that South Africa’s 
policies, both domestic and foreign, would be henceforth guided by human rights principles. On 
the international level, as South Africa transitioned from pariah to global participant, expectation 
abounded that it would be the beacon of light for oppressed peoples around the world, serving as 
a regional—even global—force for good, undergirded by a new commitment to ethical foreign 
policies. There was an expectation, in other words, that South Africa’s past would be predictive 
of its future.  
This early optimism, it turns out, was premature.  The reality has been somewhat less 
positive than human right activists had hoped for; South Africa’s foreign policy since 1994 might 
best be described as one of disparity between commitment and action. From its support of 
President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe even in the face of a growing humanitarian crisis, to its 
engagement in refoulement (the forced return of refugees) by turning away almost all refugees at 
its borders, to its overtly blocking United Nations’ actions on behalf of human rights in such 
places as Burma/Myanmar, Tibet, and East Timor, South Africa has frequently been unwilling or 
unable to act as a global standard bearer of human rights. In many ways, South Africa has turned 
out to be a disappointment to those who expected much more in the way of linkage between 
ethics and policy. 
This reality gives rise to two questions. First, why did the world expect South Africa to act in 
a certain way internationally? In other words, what led to the expectation that South Africa’s 
history of human rights abuses would translate into a future of human rights activism when 
democracy arrived with the election of Mandela’s African National Congress (ANC)? Secondly, 
why has South Africa been so disappointing in this area? In this article, we try to answer these 
questions. We first address the question of why the world expected South Africa’s past to be 
predictive of its future. We then review the theoretical debates over various “logics” that can be 
said to be drivers of states’ foreign policy decisions, making some preliminary observations 
about which theories appear best to describe South African behavior.  We next examine some of 
South Africa’s most notorious contradictory foreign policy decisions (concentrating primarily on 
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the period from 1994 through the end of Thabo Mbeki’s presidency), demonstrating the gap 
between anticipated versus actual behavior, and then analyze scholarly literature on South 
Africa’s foreign policy since 1994, with the aim of categorizing possible explanations for South 
Africa’s apparently contradictory international behavior. We identify three sets of influences on 
South Africa’s post-apartheid foreign policy – competing ideologies (including democracy, anti-
imperialism, and pan-Africanism) which all fall under the heading of the African Renaissance, 
continental constraints (African unity and its role as a regional power), and global constraints 
(economic imperatives and expectations placed on it by virtue of its ambitions to be a global 
player). The paper then returns to our theoretical analysis, in which the South African case is 
examined from the larger metatheoretical context of the rationalist/constructivist debate, and we 
conclude with some thoughts about the paradoxes of South Africa’s foreign policy. 
 
“Human Rights Will Be Our Core Concern” 
Why did South Africans and the world expect South Africa to become a particularly ethical 
international actor, one that would put human rights at the center of its foreign policy? As James 
Barber points out (2005, 1095), stating one position and then taking a different one is hardly 
unique to South Africa.  Still, South Africa does seem to have been held to a higher standard than 
most countries. Why? One answer is that South Africa told the world it would be just such an 
actor; a second is that South Africa’s history seemed to predispose it towards a particular way of 
acting.  When this did not seem to happen, Barber argues (2005, 1096), in South Africa “the gap 
between principle and practice emerged perhaps more clearly than in other cases.” 
 
A Self-Described Beacon of Hope 
The world might be forgiven for expecting South Africa to assume a mantle of morality in 
foreign policy, since Nelson Mandela—early in South Africa’s democratic transition—gave 
every indication to a watching world that it would. In a Foreign Affairs article that appeared 
months before his 1994 election, Mandela (1993, 87) listed the pillars upon which South Africa’s 
future foreign policies would rest: the belief that issues of human rights are central to 
international relations and the understanding that they extend beyond the political, embracing as 
well the economic, social and environmental. Mandela summed up his vision of South Africa’s 
role in fostering a more just and humane world by stating, “South Africa's future foreign 
relations will be based on our belief that human rights should be the core concern of international 
relations, and we are ready to play a role in fostering peace and prosperity in the world we share 
with the community of nations” (Mandela 1993, 97).2 Laurie Nathan goes so far as to say (2005, 
364) that “a principled commitment to democracy and respect for human rights was the essence 
if not the totality of President Mandela’s foreign policy.” 
The ANC Working Group (1994, 221-24) confirmed Mandela’s commitment in the vision 
and foreign policy goals it announced as it prepared to take power: 
Although a more dangerous place, the world dare not relinquish the commitment 
to Human Rights. This has a special significance for South Africa; our struggle to 
end apartheid was a global one and we believe that change has enhanced the 
necessity for a worldwide Human Rights campaign. South Africa will play a 
central role in this campaign. . . The rise of a non-racial, non-sexist democratic 
South Africa from the ashes of apartheid will not terminate our quest for human 
rights. South Africa will immediately become a fully-fledged and vital member of 
the family of nations who hold human rights issues central to foreign policy. 
  3 
Some of the steps we will take are symbolic but, in our efforts to canonise human 
rights in our international relations, we regard them as far more than this.” 
(emphasis added) 
South Africa’s stated priorities changed little over the next ten years. In 2004, its Department 
of Foreign Affairs published a strategic plan listing its foreign policy principles, with 
commitments to the promotion of human rights and democracy and to justice and international 
law in the conduct of relations between nations appearing as the top two (Nathan 2005, 362). 
Observing Mbeki’s first term of office, Nathan (2005, 362) notes “given the political distance 
between 1994 and 2004, it is striking that the current principles are virtually identical to those 
formulated by the African National Congress (ANC) at the time it came to power.” 
In sum, the ANC came to power bathed in a sense of international goodwill and domestic 
self-confidence.  It projected itself to the world as a righteous state, assuming that “having set 
South Africa to rights, it could make a similar contribution to the world” (Barber 2005, 1096).  In 
other words, the world expected South Africa to make human rights a priority in foreign policy 
precisely because South Africa told the world that it would. 
 
Past as Prologue 
Other reasons for the expectation that South Africa would consistently put the promotion of 
human rights at the forefront of its policies are its history and the background of its post-
apartheid leaders. Having been the victims of brutal and gross violations of human rights, these 
new leaders would presumably ensure that South Africa would never again engage in or condone 
such abuses. As Nathan states (2005, 362), the idealist, internationalist, and emancipatory 
orientation of the new leadership was “derive[d] from and framed by the liberation struggle.” 
Thus its history as an abuser would ensure its future as a promoter and protector of human rights.  
Paul-Henri Bischoff (2003, 189) puts it most succinctly: “There are those who expected the ANC 
as a national liberation movement assuming power to adopt only those values and objectives in 
line with its own immediate history of struggle.” Again, Mandela led the way in fostering this 
expectation. In his Foreign Affairs article, he invoked South Africa’s past to presage its future 
ethical policies, stating: 
The anti-apartheid campaign was the most important human rights crusade of the 
post-World War II era. Its success was a demonstration, in my opinion, of the 
oneness of our common humanity: in these troubled times, its passion should not 
be lost.  Consequently, South Africa will not be indifferent to the rights of others. 
Human rights will be the light that guides our foreign affairs (Mandela 1993, 88).  
Indeed, Chris Alden and Garth le Pere (2004, 284) argue that Mandela very consciously drew 
on his country’s apartheid history to explain its foreign policy decisions: “by incorporating the 
experiences of the anti-apartheid struggle into the conduct of foreign policy, the ANC leader 
sought to imbue the practice of international affairs with an explicit orientation towards the 
promotion of civil liberties and democratisation.”  
The notion that South Africa’s present behavior can be explained by its past pertains not only 
to its history of apartheid-era abuses and the struggle against them but also to the quality of 
South Africa’s negotiated transition from authoritarianism to democracy. Whereas the world 
expected a bloodbath, South Africa delivered a relatively bloodless transfer of power, an event 
which continues to be described as the “South African miracle.”  One outcome of the miracle, of 
course, was the South African constitution, widely regarded as perhaps the most human-rights-
granting document of its kind in the world. As a result of its constitution with its expansive bill 
  4 
of rights and a Constitutional Court to adjudicate it, South Africa saw itself and was seen by the 
world as a country that would advocate for human rights. Bischoff has noted that in light of its 
past, South Africa had certain expectations thrust upon it regarding its future role. As a result of 
its negotiated settlement and its emergence as a constitutional democracy, Bischoff claims (2003, 
184), South Africa was “afforded the opportunity to project itself as a country that stood for 
inclusivity and that could function as an honest broker, a diplomatic niche player, projecting 
southern concerns towards an evolving (neo-)liberal world order.” Again, South African leaders 
have consciously cultivated this perspective, as Alden and le Pere (2004, 283) note, “Nelson 
Mandela and his successor Thabo Mbeki have sought to invigorate the conduct of international 
affairs with reference to South Africa’s unique transition and moral stature.” Alden and le Pere 
sum up these twin expectations— of South Africa anointing itself as the leader in adopting a 
human rights-based foreign policy and of having this mantle thrust upon it: “By virtue of its 
‘miraculous’ transition, South Africa was expected by the international community to ‘punch 
above its weight,’ a view that South African officials tended to encourage” (294). 
 
Identities and Interests: The Theoretical Debates 
How might international relations theory help us explain the South African case, and how might 
the South African case help us refine existing theory? The question of expected foreign policy 
behavior has most recently been framed by the rationalist-constructivist metatheoretical debate. 
These two perspectives predict very different foreign policy behavior. The so-called rationalist 
side argues that state interests are fixed and that states pursue those interests in a rational manner 
to maximize their achievement. There may be a debate among different strands of rationalists, 
from those who argue that the anarchical nature of the international system is inherently 
conflictual, making cooperation impossible (Waltz 1979), to those who maintain that the 
anarchical nature of the international system does not preclude cooperation and, in fact, that 
cooperation may be the most rational path to achieving the national interest, even though the 
institutions themselves may have a limited impact on changing state behavior (Glaser 1994). 
They both agree, however, that such interests are the same for all states. States are deemed to be 
working within a “logic of consequences” (Finnemore 1996, 28-31) – they are pursuing 
predetermined state interests (Finnemore 1996, 7-10), focusing solely on the consequences of 
their actions (i.e., how the actions help them achieve their goals) rather than worrying about how 
their actions cohere with international norms and other expectations (Krasner 1999, 3-6; 
Keohane 1986; Scott, Reynolds, and Lott 1995, 33-38). 
Constructivists, on the other hand, argue that state preferences are not fixed. They are related 
to a state’s identity, which may change as a result of socialization in the international realm 
(Risse 2002, 599-600) as well as domestic change. Constructivists still expect states to pursue 
their interests – no state will act against what it sees as its national interest – but the 
interpretation of that national interest will vary from state to state and may change over time 
depending upon changes in their perceived identities. Thus, states are seen as operating 
according to a “logic of appropriateness” (Finnemore 1996, 5-7, 29) – engaging in behavior that 
is determined either by what is expected of them by the international community (such as 
complying with human rights norms), or by what they expect of themselves as a result of self-
perceptions of their identity (as, for example, a country that protects human rights) (see Mills and 
Lott, 2007). 
Frequently these two perspectives are portrayed as in absolute conflict – either rationalism 
explains state behavior or constructivism provides the best insight into how a state behaves on 
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the international scene. Yet, it is clear that neither perspective can adequately explain how states 
act internationally (Risse 2002, 597).  States are embedded in a community of states with many – 
and frequently contradictory – norms, rules, and laws that create expectations for how states 
should act. Sometimes – in fact, frequently – these expectations are confounded. Mills and Lott 
(2007), drawing on March and Olsen (1998), maintain that these two metatheoretical 
explanations can interact in different ways.  First, one finds situations where both the logics of 
consequences and appropriateness seem to play a part in determining state action in a particular 
circumstance – states seem to be acting on traditionally defined state interests while also reacting 
to external expectations. They label this a “concurrent” logic ordering. In addition, Mills and 
Lott argue (2007, 503) that state behavior may be structured by one or the other of the logics 
either by constituting state identity and interests (the logic of appropriateness) or by constraining 
state behavior (the logic of consequences): 
In the first instance, norms constitute the decision-making environment of states. 
In the second, perceived state interests constrain the range of choices open to the 
state. The mere fact that a response must be made to a particular international 
issue may be a reaction to some normative concern in the international arena. 
Alternatively, a logic of consequences may constrain the range of normatively 
appropriate actions. Self-interest explanations may constrain a normative process. 
To these three ordering logics – consequences, appropriateness, and concurrence – Risse 
(2000) and Mills (2009) add a fourth, the “logic of arguing.” This logic tends to come into play 
when a state’s interests are not settled: 
Argumentative and deliberative behavior is as goal oriented as strategic 
interaction, but the goal is not to attain one’s fixed preferences, but to seek a 
reasoned consensus. Actors’ interests, preferences, and the perceptions of the 
situation are no longer fixed, but subject to discursive challenges. Where 
argumentative rationality prevails, actors do not seek to maximize or to satisfy 
their given interests and preferences, but to challenge and to justify the validity 
claims inherent in them – and they are prepared to change their views of the world 
or even their interests in light of the better argument (Risse 2000, 7). 
Further, the logic of arguing may be constitutive, but in situations in which there are conflicts 
between norms or in which norms are in flux,  
states may feel a conflict between norms and may move between them in 
unpredictable ways…. There may be real conflict between… sets of norms that 
will make the normative milieu more complex…. while norms constitute the 
decision-making environment of states, the evolving and ongoing conflictive 
nature of different norms complicates the relationship between them, opening up 
more space for “argument” among states (Mills 2009, 542). 
Thus, we may see situations in which state action is primarily determined by traditional state 
interests, where state behavior appears to be guided more by internal and external expectations of 
what the state should do, where such expectations conflict and thus lead to confusing and 
apparently paradoxical behavior, or where both traditional state interests and expected behavior 
simultaneously explain a particular action or set of actions on the part of a state. Each of these 
dynamics can be found in the foreign policy of post-apartheid South Africa.  
 
South Africa: A Constructivist State with “Neo-Neo” Tendencies? 
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Both South Africa’s domestic historical development and the international milieu in which it 
took place would seem to mitigate in favor of a particular way of acting that is at odds with much 
of its actual behavior. Yet, those expecting such consistent behavior ignore other powerful forces 
which push against such expectations. The debate might be framed by asking whether South 
Africa is an exceptional state or a regular state – or both. As Peter Vale and Ian Taylor (1999, 
630) argue, “South Africa’s foreign policy… reflects a dual image – a Ying and Yang as it were 
– between being both ‘something special’, and ‘just another country.’” 
 
Historically Exceptional 
The election of Nelson Mandela in 1994 marked the end of decades of struggle – both domestic 
and international – that brought the end of apartheid. Apartheid defined South Africa both 
domestically and internationally. Its domestic policies led to an aggressive foreign policy in 
southern Africa dedicated to defending apartheid from its neighboring states and from anti-
apartheid activists who found refuge in such states. They also led to international movements and 
foreign policies on the part of other states dedicated to ending apartheid. The minority white 
government’s understanding of South Africa’s identity led it to pay little attention to 
international expectations for many years. 
According to rationalist accounts of state behavior, states are not supposed to radically 
change their understandings of themselves and their interests. Yet, this is exactly what happened 
when the ANC came into power in 1994. Since its founding in 1912, the ANC had been 
dedicated to creating a nonracial South Africa. When it came to power it sought to make this a 
reality, dramatically transforming the South African state.  Its domestic struggle also translated 
into a vision of South Africa where human rights are respected, and its constitution is one of the 
most protective of human rights on the planet. Moreover, as we will demonstrate, the ANC 
sought to expand this orientation into the international realm by making human rights a key 
driver of its foreign policy. The international support given to the ANC and the anti-apartheid 
movement by the international community created a debt that South Africa felt it had to repay in 
kind by supporting such human rights norms internationally. The new government thus sought to 
create an international identity that reflected its own historical struggle as well as the struggle of 
the rest of the international community, and that also corresponded to evolving international 
norms with respect to human rights. Thus, South Africa’s history, which drove this new identity, 
combined with the centrality of human rights in South African policymaking, make it a 
somewhat exceptional state, and exceptional states are expected to do exceptional things – and 
usually expect exceptional things of themselves. 
South Africa’s identity and its perceptions of its interests, rather than being traditionally 
rationalist, are domestically generated based on its history and its new understanding of itself. 
We thus seem to have a very strong constructivist account of South Africa’s stated policies. 
However, this constructivist interpretation can only go so far in explaining actual behavior. We 
need to look at other understandings of the bases of South Africa’s foreign policy to explain the 
disjuncture between the expectations placed on South Africa by itself and others and its actual 
behavior. 
 
Situationally Ordinary 
South Africa may in some ways be an exceptional state, which helps to explain its identity and 
interests. However, in other ways it is just another, somewhat ordinary state. From a structural, 
neo-realist perspective, it is a regional power with regional power interests. Even though it goes 
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to great lengths to portray itself as anything but a regional hegemon — although many expect it 
to act as such at times (Adebajo, Adedeji, and Landsberg 2007, 27-28) —  it sometimes cannot 
help acting as such, even though, as Adebajo et al. argue, South Africa “lacks the economic and 
military muscle and political legitimacy to impose its preferences on its own Southern African 
subregion, let alone the continent” (24). And, it has traditional security interests. While it has no 
reason to fear for its military security from neighboring states – none has the military strength to 
challenge it – it does fear for its economic security and has thus attempted to tighten its borders 
and exclude many of the foreign workers who had previously been at the heart of a relatively 
open system of regional worker migration. A concomitant domestic xenophobia flows, at least 
partly, from its inability to create the wealth and opportunities to dramatically improve the lives 
of the black majority. 
South Africa’s regional and economic security concerns and its position and aspirations 
as a regional power and a global “middle power” (Bischoff 2003; Neethling 2003, 4-6) have led 
it to expound and pursue two classic neo-liberal strategies – neo-liberal economic policies and 
multilateralism. As will be argued below, the first has had significant effects on other policies, 
constraining South Africa’s perceived maneuvering room in pursuing some human-rights-
oriented foreign policies. The second has moderated South Africa’s positions as it works within 
multilateral settings seeking consensus rather than confrontation, and as it seeks to ensure its 
own economic development along neo-liberal lines.  In the post-Mandela period it has expanded 
its participation in peacekeeping operations (Schoeman 2007, 98), thus helping to undergird its 
aspirations to take its place as a middle power, perhaps in the vein of Canada or Sweden (Alden 
and Le Pere 2004, 288). It played a significant role in developing the African Union (AU) as a 
stronger incarnation of the Organization of African Unity, including developing the African Peer 
Review Mechanism, whereby African states voluntarily undergo scrutiny of their domestic 
behavior, and successfully pushing for inclusion of the right to intervene militarily for 
humanitarian purposes by the AU in the Constitutive Act of the African Union (Landsberg 2007, 
195-212). But it is not a radical vision; rather, it promotes “rules-based change and progress” 
(Schoeman 2007, 98) through multilateralism. It is incrementalist rather than revolutionary in 
orientation, as it seeks to work within existing frameworks. Given that the AU is still a 
conservative organization with many repressive states as members, combined with South 
Africa’s commitment to multilateralism, it is understandable that it has not acted as a more 
activist state (assuming that was its wont in the first place).
3
  
We thus see both rationalist “neos” – neo-realism and neo-liberalism (Williams 2000, 73) 
– reflected in the above discussion. South Africa, while perhaps exceptional in some ways, is 
rather ordinary in others, and even though the ANC claimed it would pursue a human-rights-
based foreign policy, South Africa has in fact pursued traditionally defined interests, even at the 
expense of its declared principles. At the end of this article, we revisit the theoretical question of 
how to explain whether and how the different logic orderings, as seen through these different 
descriptions of the basis of South African foreign policy, help explain South Africa’s paradoxical 
behavior.  But first, we delve deeper into the paradoxes and discontinuities of South African 
foreign policy. 
 
“A Betrayal of Our Noble Past” 
Thus described Archbishop Desmond Tutu, Nobel Peace Prize winner and stalwart of the anti-
apartheid movement, South Africa’s actions (or inactions) in relation to the human-rights-
promoting work of the United Nations (quoted in Neuer 2007). Tutu has not been alone in his 
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disappointment at South Africa’s consistent opposition to UN resolutions condemning human 
rights abuses and abusers around the world. A cursory overview of some of the most egregious 
examples should suffice to confirm Tutu’s dismay. South Africa’s UN-related actions take place 
both in New York, as a member of the UN Security Council (a position it held in 2007 and 2008, 
including service as chair of the Council in April 2008), and in Geneva, as one of the first 47 
members of the newly created Human Rights Council (a position South Africa held from 2006 to 
2010). One of the most notorious examples of South Africa siding against human rights in the 
Security Council  came in January 2007 when, in its first vote since attaining a nonpermanent 
seat on the Council, South Africa joined China and Russia as the only members of the 15-
member body to oppose a relatively mild resolution urging Burma/Myanmar (widely considered 
one of the most repressive governments in the world) to free political detainees and condemning 
the military government’s crackdown on peaceful protests.  Responding to Burma/Myanmar’s 
victory-claiming response to the vote, Tutu lamented, “the tyrannical military regime is gloating, 
and we sided with them” (International Herald Tribune 2007). Other noteworthy human-rights-
abusing regimes that South Africa has shown little willingness to condemn are Sudan and 
Zimbabwe — two cases that are particularly striking in light of South Africa’s view of itself as 
having a special role in solving African conflicts.  In the Sudan case, in June 2007, the United 
States asked the UN Security Council to implement an arms embargo against Sudan, a request 
that was met with immediate opposition from Russia, China, and South Africa. Further, South 
Africa was at the forefront (along with Libya) of a movement to prevent the International 
Criminal Court from securing an arrest warrant for Omar al-Bashir, the Sudanese president, for 
alleged genocide in Darfur – even though it was a significant force in the creation of the ICC in 
the first place. More recently it has defied African Union resolutions calling on African states not 
to cooperate with the ICC by stating that it would arrest President Bashir if he came to South 
Africa (Kwinika 2010), thus lending an element of contradiction to its policies. All in all, many 
human rights activists would undoubtedly agree with The Economist’s assessment (2008) that 
during its two years as a nonpermanent member of the Security Council, South Africa 
consistently allied itself with several authoritarian regimes to water down or block virtually 
every resolution pertaining to human rights abuses by states. Human Rights Watch was even 
more succinct, stating that South Africa’s human rights reputation had been tarnished (Bogert 
2008). 
In terms of the South Africa’s membership on the Human Rights Council, a May 2007 report 
by UN Watch (a Geneva-based watchdog NGO) rated all 47 members of the Council based on 
twenty key votes during its first year. South Africa scored at the bottom, with a grade of minus 
16, tied with Cuba, Russia, China, and Saudi Arabia (UN Watch 2007a).
 
The report concluded 
that “South Africa voted consistently at the UN in solidarity with the perpetrators of human 
rights violations instead of with the victims” (UN Watch 2007b). A study by the Democracy 
Coalition Project came to a similarly discouraging conclusion. Its report measured country 
support (or lack thereof) for credible and independent mechanisms for addressing country-
specific violations, without which the highly touted Universal Periodic Review (UPR) procedure 
would be closer to a farce than to the serious mechanism it was originally envisioned as. The 
Project’s “Human Rights Council Report Card” for 2007-2008 revealed, among other things, that 
South Africa opposed submissions from civil society directly to the Council and instead 
supported the position that information provided by the states themselves should form the basis 
for Council review (Democracy Coalition Project 2007). This position has widely been 
interpreted as an attempt to make the UPR as “toothless” as possible (Neuer 2007). Some of 
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South Africa’s other actions on the Human Rights Council included a vote to discontinue the 
Council’s confidential consideration of violations by Iran and Uzbekistan, despite widespread 
torture there, and support of a resolution to terminate all country-specific mandates.  South 
Africa has also been seen as siding with the government of Sudan in the Council vis-à-vis the 
Darfur conflict, such as when, in March 2007 South Africa endorsed a weak resolution that 
failed to condemn Sudan for its handling of the situation in Darfur (UN Watch 2007a, 14).  
South Africa’s puzzling UN behavior constitutes one of the most clear-cut paradoxes of its 
foreign policy: the United Nations, as the institutional home of the global anti-apartheid 
movement, played no small part in the bringing down of the apartheid system. However, when 
given the opportunity to support bringing similar UN pressure to bear on other human-rights-
abusing regimes, South Africa has refused to do so.  
While South Africa’s behavior in the UN obviously reveals that rhetoric would not always be 
matched by actions, by far the best-known chasm between expectations and deeds has been the 
government’s unwillingness to publicly confront Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe or to condemn the 
gross violations of human rights committed by his government and followers. While South 
Africa has been reluctant to confront Mugabe for several years, its unwillingness to condemn the 
Zimbabwean government for its human rights abuses was particularly glaring in the period 
surrounding the March 2008 general election, which was widely deemed by the international 
community to have been neither free nor fair, in large part due to violent voter intimidation 
attributed mainly to Mugabe supporters.  South Africa used its position as president of the UN 
Security Council in April 2008 to prevent sending a fact-finding mission or special envoy to 
investigate post-election violence; nor would it allow the Council to debate the worsening 
situation. Indeed, during the month that South Africa held the Security Council presidency—i.e., 
the month in which post-election violence in Zimbabwe soared—Thabo Mbeki declared that 
there was “no crisis” in Zimbabwe. Finally, in June 2008, in the midst of increasing violence in 
the days preceding a runoff election, the Security Council issued a one-page statement (which 
was watered down at the insistence of South Africa, Russia and China) calling on the 
government of Zimbabwe to permit opposition rallies and to free political prisoners. However, 
when a United States-sponsored resolution calling for sanctions (primarily in the form of an arms 
embargo and targeted travel and financial sanctions against fourteen people) against Zimbabwe 
was introduced in July 2008 (in the aftermath of a runoff election deemed almost universally to 
be illegitimate), it was defeated by a rare double veto by China and Russia—which found 
themselves in the company of South Africa, Libya, and Vietnam in voting against sanctions.  
(South Africa had also refused to condemn the election-related brutality in the Human Rights 
Council in March 2007).   
In December 2008, acting South African president Kgalema Motlanthe refused to join other 
world leaders, including Condoleeza Rice of the United States, Nicolas Sarkozy of France, and 
Seretse Ian Khama of Botswana, in their calls for Mugabe to step down in the context of a 
growing humanitarian crisis exemplified by an outbreak of cholera, which had affected close to 
40,000 people by January 2009, killing almost 2,000 of them. The paradox is clear: South 
African leaders, once victims of a brutal and oppressive regime, are now implicitly condoning 
brutality and oppression of Africans, in the country directly to its north. South Africa’s refusal to 
condemn Mugabe is all the more striking because in the early 1980s a newly independent 
Zimbabwe used its position as a nonpermanent Security Council member to vote to condemn the 
apartheid regime (Wines 2007). Noting the impact that South Africa’s tacit support of Mugabe 
has had on its reputation, The Economist (2008) opined that “among the international human-
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rights fraternity, post-apartheid South Africa—the democratic, multicultural ‘rainbow nation’ 
forged by Nelson Mandela—is once again regarded as something of a pariah,” and it accused 
Pretoria of aligning with “some of the world’s least savoury regimes.” 
South Africa’s pro-Zimbabwe policy has resulted directly in a third apparent paradox of 
South African foreign policy: its treatment of refugees. As Zimbabwe approaches the status of a 
failed state, more than three million Zimbabweans are estimated to have fled in the past few 
years—almost half of them to South Africa, where they face a profoundly unwelcoming South 
African immigration system that, more often than not, treats all refugees as voluntary economic 
migrants and summarily deports them without determining the validity of their asylum claims. 
Human Rights Watch has documented the often-unlawful deportation of more than 250,000 
Zimbabweans a year, revealing that South Africa engages in refoulement, thereby violating the 
most basic principle of refugee law: the right not to be forcibly returned to persecution (Human 
Rights Watch 2008, 1). Again, the policy paradox is clear: the ANC government, many of whose 
leaders received refuge in neighboring countries while fleeing the abusive apartheid regime, are 
now regularly implementing human-rights-abusing refugee policies themselves. As Nathan notes 
(2005, 371), “the treatment of African refugees and asylum seekers is shamefully reminiscent of 
the apartheid era.” 
 
Making Sense of the Contradictions 
Having addressed the first question of why so much was expected of South Africa and examined 
South Africa’s actual foreign policy behavior, we now turn to the question of why these 
expectations have not been met. We identify three explanations of South Africa’s foreign 
policies under the Mandela and Mbeki regimes. As we will demonstrate, these explanations 
correspond to the various ordering logics outlined above.  
 
Competing Ideologies 
Since South Africa’s policies towards Zimbabwe (especially Mbeki’s “quiet diplomacy”) have 
been so controversial, it is perhaps not surprising that they have been the focus of many scholarly 
writings. Laurie Nathan concentrates primarily on Mbeki’s foreign policy priorities, which he 
says emphasize Afrocentrism; a principled commitment to democracy and respect for human 
rights; a holistic approach to security in which the primary threats to security are seen not as 
military but as bad governance and underdevelopment; a commitment to pacific forms of conflict 
resolution, especially through mediation; and the promotion of multilateralism in the 
international system.  These themes clearly match South Africa’s stated commitment to placing 
human rights at the forefront of foreign policy. The discontinuities arise, however, Nathan 
argues, because these five pillars are informed by, and are sometimes in conflict with, Mbeki’s 
own ideological commitments. “In international affairs,” Nathan notes, “Mbeki is as much an 
ideologue as a pragmatist, his outlook rooted in three paradigms: democratic; Africanist; and 
anti-imperialist.” Herein lies the rub—sometimes Mbeki’s ideologies complement, and indeed 
shore up, his foreign policy priorities; at other times, however, the two (foreign policy goals and 
ideology) stand at cross purposes with each other. Specifically, Nathan notes (2005, 363), “the 
Africanist and anti-imperialist paradigms, which include a visceral anger at historical and 
contemporary manifestations of imperialism and racism, are seldom if ever in conflict with each 
other, but both are occasionally in conflict with the democratic paradigms.  In these cases, it is 
usually the democratic position that gives way.”  
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While Nathan does not refer to it this way, Mbeki’s personal ideology has often been 
summed up as the “African Renaissance,” which one scholar has referred to as “the defining 
policy concept of Thabo Mbeki’s presidential administration” (Jo-Ansie van Wyk, quoted in 
Neethling 2003, 8). The concept has been defined in various ways, and different scholars 
highlight different aspects and implications of the set of ideas embodied in the concept.  Bischoff 
(2003, 199) defines the African Renaissance as resting on three pillars: “the mobilisation of the 
African people to take their destiny in their own hands and stand up for clean and purposive 
government; the establishment of political democracy, respect for human rights and good 
governance; a clear program of economic regeneration to help reposition Africa in the world 
economy and at the same time bring about a new more equitable world order.” Mbeki himself 
(1998) described the philosophy as being in part anti-colonial; in part an attempt to assert 
Africa’s capacity to solve its own problems; and in part a call for the restoration of the dignity of 
Africans.  On other occasions, he has emphasized good governance (defined as civilian rather 
than military governments, multiparty rather than one-party states, and the adoption of the 
African Charter of Human and People’s Rights), and end to poverty and disease (especially 
through economic development and under the leadership of the Southern African Development 
Community [SADC]), and cooperation against violence (through regional peacekeeping and 
security arrangements and through regional cooperation to combat crime).  
It is clear that the seeds of potential contradiction are contained in Mbeki’s philosophy: the 
African Renaissance is simultaneously anti-imperial and anti-colonial (and might thus be pro-
Mugabe) as well as supportive of democratic good governance (and might thus be anti-Mugabe). 
The African Renaissance is pro-Africanist (and might thus predict a willingness to allow  
suffering African refugees to enter South Africa) but also pro-development (which might predict 
a policy of being unwelcoming to people who could be viewed as economic migrants). 
Applying this set of contradictions to South Africa’s approach to Zimbabwe, one of 
Mugabe’s core interests – land reform – has resulted in severe human rights abuses. Mugabe has 
consistently framed the issue in terms of righting colonial-era wrongs, and this clearly resonates 
with Mbeki’s anti-imperial ideology.  However, Mbeki endorsed the principle “without 
questioning the illegal and violent manner in which it was done,” thus confirming Nathan’s sense 
(2005) that Mbeki’s anti-imperialist ideology trumps his commitment to human rights and the 
rule of law. James Barber (2005, 1093) echoes Nathan’s analysis, noting that in 2003 Mbeki 
attributed Zimbabwe’s problems not to bad governance on the part of Mugabe but rather to “the 
legacy of colonialism and white dominance.” Mbeki consolidated his anti-colonial/anti-imperial 
credentials by accusing prime ministers Tony Blair of the United Kingdom and John Howard of 
Australia of being racist, claiming that their proposal at a 2003 Commonwealth meeting to 
ostracize Mugabe was “inspired by notions of white supremacy” (quoted in Barber 2005, 1093). 
Like Nathan, Barber chalks up Mbeki’s support for Zimbabwe to the aligning of two of his three 
ideologies: anti-colonialism and pro-Africanism. Barber sees these ideologies playing out in 
three ways. First, Mbeki consistently opposed Western interference in Zimbabwe. Second, his 
support for Mugabe reflects his respect for the Zimbabwean leader’s stature as a hero of the 
liberation struggle, the last of the first generation of African leaders still in power. As such, 
Mugabe holds for many, Mbeki included, “a special place in the liberation saga;” he is, for them, 
“a living legend.” Finally, Mugabe’s stated goal of returning land to indigenous blacks—its 
rightful owners—fit well into Mbeki’s anti-colonial worldview (Barber 2005, 1094).  In light of 
all of this, the third strand of Mbeki’s ideological outlook—support for democracy—was bound 
to be overlooked. South Africa’s accomodationist policies towards Zimbabwe are, in short, a far 
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cry from the ANC Working Group statement (1994) that “Human rights concerns will also 
influence our bilateral relations. In this we shall not be selective nor, indeed, will we be afraid to 
raise human rights violations with countries where our own and other interests might be 
negatively affected. South Africa’s experience, we believe, shows how damaging policy can be 
when issues of principle are sacrificed to economic and political expediency.” 
We can also make sense of South Africa’s UN actions by viewing them in the light of 
conflicting ideologies. The promotion of multilateralism as a means for maintaining global order 
and addressing global problems was a stated focus of Mbeki’s presidency, explaining South 
Africa’s desire to play an important role in both international multilateral regimes (as onetime 
chair of UN Conference on Trade and Development, the UN Commission of Human Rights, and 
the Non-Aligned Movement, for example) and continental multilateral regimes such as the 
SADC, the New Partnership for Africa’s Development, and the African Union, for example.  
This focus also explains South Africa’s stated goal of playing the role of reformer in the 
international financial institutions and the United Nations, especially the Security Council. 
However, having achieved its goal of becoming a Security Council member, the pro-African and 
anti-colonial values seem to have taken over. Neuer (2007) claims that South Africa dismissed 
the Council vote condemning Burma as yet another campaign by the wealthy North. Human 
Rights Watch claims that South Africa views the International Criminal Court as an anti-African 
institution (Bogert 2008) (although its initial strong support for the Court, along with its recent 
defiant tone against the official AU position when it declared it would arrest Bashir should he 
come to South Africa, problematize such a black and white interpretation). One American 
diplomat explains South Africa’s performance in its two years on the Security Council thus: 
“What you have here is the continuing, ongoing tussle over whether the A.N.C. is still a protest 
movement or the governing party of a responsible member of the international community. . . . 
They’re reflexively against anything we’re for—we in the States, we and the British, we in the 
North.  It’s more Chinese than the Chinese” (quoted in Wines 2007). 
Graham Evans (1999, 623) offers a different perspective on competing ideologies as an 
explanation for contradictory policies. Evans examines the history of the ANC’s thinking on 
international relations and sees three distinct phases. From 1912 (the time of its founding) 
through 1960 (the time of its banning), the ANC’s international thinking was akin to today’s 
liberal internationalism. This was succeeded by the period from 1960-1993 (the time of its exile), 
when the ANC’s foreign policy can be described as socialist. Finally, from 1993 on, the ANC’s 
foreign policy ideology was in Evans’ view pragmatist. Each change in ideological orientation, 
Evans argues, occurred in response to external stimuli (1999, 623). The crux of Evans’ argument 
is this: South Africa’s apparently contradictory foreign policy today reflects the fact that it 
contains elements drawn from all three historical ideological phases. Specifically, he notes: 
The alleged confusion in post-apartheid South Africa as to the nature of foreign 
policy and the kinds of roles the state should adopt in the region and in the wider 
world is in no small part attributable to the pull/push effects of this competing 
triad of theoretical perspectives and the lack of consensus the tensions between 
them have generated within the ranks of the ruling party.  The result is that 
foreign policy is often argued out within a context of competing and often 
mutually exclusive perspectives (623). 
In other words, one policy choice might reflect one historical perspective, while another choice 
might reflect a different perspective. Applying Evans’ explanations, one can see for example, 
that South Africa’s policy of preventing a flood of supposed economic migrants from crossing its 
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border is an economically pragmatic decision for a country facing an unemployment rate of close 
to 25%. However, this policy towards migrants, many of whom are African refugees, stands in 
direct contradiction to the socialist-informed demand that policy ought to be ethical, solidarist, 
and Afrocentric.  Likewise, Pretoria’s demands for UN reform and its active quest for a larger 
role in the UN Security Council reflects elements of a historic commitment to liberal 
internationalism. However, once on the Security Council, its policies appeared driven instead by 
pro-African and anti-Western socialism. These competing, often mutually exclusive, policies that 
derive from the developmental phases of ANC thinking are an indication to Evans (1999, 623) 
that “South Africa’s post-Cold War and post-apartheid identity and its conception of where its 
national interests lie, is still in the process of gestation.” For Evans, then, the observed gap 
between rhetoric and reality can best be explained as a function of historical tensions that 
continue to be played out on the world stage today: “the main division [has been] between 
second-phase populists and ideologues and third-phase pragmatists and neo-liberals.  This 
ongoing debate has served to frustrate the development of a coherent world-view and the 
accusations of vacillation, ineffectualness and ‘ad hoc-ery’ that have been leveled at the new 
South Africa’s foreign policy” (624). 
 We thus see a constructivist logic of appropriateness operating, as South Africa’s 
ideologies and ideas about itself come to the fore in defining South African policies. However, it 
is constructivism with an argumentative twist, since there is an ongoing debate within and 
between ideologies. As South Africa “argues” with itself over which vision or version or element 
of the African Renaissance to prioritize, one sees a somewhat incoherent answer, with the 
democracy/human rights element winning at times, but the anti-imperial/Afrocentric elements 
prevailing more often. 
 
Continental Constraints 
The second factor that explains discontinuities in South Africa’s recent foreign policy behavior is 
closely related to the first one, especially in relation to Mbeki’s African Renaissance ideology. 
One of the ideas implicit in the African Renaissance is African unity. If Africans are resolved to 
address their own problems, free from former colonial—and especially Western—influence, then 
one approach is a closing of ranks, a circling of wagons of sorts, among African countries. To the 
extent that this has happened, African countries have by and large said to the West, “yes, we 
have our problems, but they are our problems. You do not have the right to criticize us, nor can 
you solve them for us.” Mbeki himself linked the ideas of African unity and African self-
sufficiency in his speech in Durban at the launching of the African Union in 2002, saying: 
Imperialism and colonialism had sought to own and control Africa permanently, 
from Cape to Cairo.  African pride and courage ensured that Africans own and 
control Africa permanently, from Cape to Cairo.  .  .  By forming the Union, the 
peoples of our continent have made the unequivocal statement that Africa must 
unite! We as Africans have a common and a shared destiny! Together, we must 
redefine this destiny for a better life for all the people of this continent (South 
African Department of Foreign Affairs 2002). 
By itself, the concept of African unity need not be the engine of contradictory foreign policy 
for South Africa. However, contradictions have arisen when the South African government has 
opted to choose unity with authoritarian human-rights abusing regimes in the name of African 
unity. The prioritizing of solidarity politics over rights-based politics on a continent rife with 
anti-democratic leaders represents what we term a continental constraint for South Africa, one 
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that is part of the explanation of the gap between rhetoric and reality in its foreign policy. Other 
scholars who have noted a sense of constraint inherent in African solidarist politics include 
Alden and le Pere (2004), who claim, for example, that South Africa’s ability to promote ethical 
values has been made difficult  because of the ambivalence towards democracy and human rights 
among key SADC leaders. Although the rhetoric of democracy and human rights featured 
prominently in the immediate post-apartheid foreign policy debates, they argue, the need to work 
within SADC, despite that organization’s formal commitment to these issues, “has tended to 
circumscribe substantive action in support of these values. This in turn has had a direct effect 
upon the selection of tools available to policy makers in Pretoria, limiting them to public 
statements through SADC that emphasised organizational cohesion [i.e., solidarity] over 
expressions of concern or condemnation of actions by fellow members” (290).4  
In relation to the issue areas explored above, Nathan (2005, 367) makes the connection 
between South Africa’s (and SADC’s) desire for unity and its concomitant impact on its policies 
in its relationship with Zimbabwe. He notes:  
They [the SADC] are determined to maintain a posture of unity and solidarity.  
Forged in the heat of the struggles against colonialism and apartheid, this posture 
militates against public criticism of each other.  The imperative of solidarity is 
greatest when foreign powers raise concerns that are perceived as reflecting an 
imperialist agenda.  These dynamics have been evident in extremis in the case of 
Zimbabwe.  Here, far from remaining silent, SADC has repeatedly expressed 
solidarity with Harare and trivialized human rights concerns. 
Alden and le Pere (2004, 283) similarly note that South Africa’s puzzling foreign policy choices 
can be explained in part by what they refer to as its paradoxical legacy of the apartheid state and 
the liberation movement. They argue that “the new South Africa faced contradictory tensions in 
developing an activist role in foreign policy premised upon a belief in the compatibility of 
human rights norms, solidarity politics, and its own development needs.” In other words, South 
Africa felt the tension of wanting to project a moral foreign policy because of its legacy of 
apartheid, but also wanting to stand in solidarity with states that are not always human rights 
supporters but that supported the ANC when it was a liberation movement.  Again, one gets a 
sense of a value hierarchy—African solidarity trumps human rights and democracy:  
Even in those crises—Zimbabwe in particular—where South African interests 
were most directly effected [sic] and leverage was assumed to be considerable, 
the range of actions available that would not exact costs in terms of SADC unity. . 
. . turned out to be far fewer than policy makers in Pretoria had anticipated. By 
adopting the ‘quiet diplomacy’ approach towards Zimbabwe, Mbeki had hoped to 
underscore the limitations of South Africa’s willingness to overtly challenge the 
non-interventionist norm in SADC. . . (Alden and le Pere 2004, 290). 
In truth, Bischoff (2003, 191) concludes, the idea that an African renaissance would result in a 
“mass crusade against authoritarian and corrupt ruling leaders” turned out to be “more promise 
than policy,” as human rights issues have consistently been “subsumed under the need for states 
inclusively to seek unity of purpose.” 
One reason South Africa has generally been unable to  overcome the continental constraint of 
African unity, even if it wished to, has to do with its own role—both historical and 
contemporary—on the continent. The government has had to be wary of being seen as being too 
assertive because of regional fears of domination, especially in light of its history of regional 
destabilization in the 1990s. As Alden and le Pere (2004, 289) note, “Complicating South 
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Africa’s engagement with the region is its own history of intervention in regional affairs, much 
of which centred upon destabilising regional co-operation, and a contemporary desire to undo 
that legacy through active consultation with member states.” South Africa’s African partners 
continue to maintain a fair amount of skepticism about its aspirations for continental leadership. 
Mbeki in particular was regarded with suspicion by other African leaders, privately referred to as 
the “George Bush of Africa,” “leading the most powerful nation in the neighborhood and using 
his financial and military muscle to further his own agenda” (Neethling 2003, 15). Thus, South 
Africa’s history as a regional bully combined with its potential of being a modern-day one have, 
in many ways, forced the government to err on the side of unity rather than condemnation when 
faced with human rights abuses in its backyard. Bischoff (2003, 194) sums up this dilemma well:  
There are African governments that would prefer South Africa not to play a 
leadership role.  Consequently, South Africa fears the political fallout from not 
acting collectively.  Political opponents fearing their own displacement in the 
politics of the continent and leaders used to having things their own way in 
settings where ‘brother does not attack brother’ are loath to award the role of a 
diplomatic broker to Pretoria. 
 Again, we see an argument between different elements of the African Renaissance 
ideology and the legacy of South Africa’s past. Yet, this argument is also tinged by more 
consequentialist concerns. To maintain its power, it needs to been seen as not overly powerful 
and domineering, and thus has to acquiesce to less human rights-supporting currents in Africa to 
reinforce its African unity credentials. Thus, both ideational arguments and material concerns are 
operating concurrently, although the latter frequently appear to hold greater sway and thus 
constrains the possible outcomes of the ideational arguments. 
 
Global Constraints 
Perhaps a more forgiving explanation for South Africa’s inability to live up to its professed 
ideals is that the same global conditions that facilitated apartheid’s demise also constrain South 
Africa’s foreign policy choices. This is especially true in relation to so-called second generation 
social and economic rights. One of the core tenets of Mbeki’s African Renaissance was a 
commitment to global redistribution of wealth, with a special emphasis on economic 
development in Africa. Along with competing ideologies and continental constraints, this points 
to a third tension, between South Africa’s desire to play an activist role in pushing human rights 
norms globally and its need to ensure its own economic development. Moreover, South Africa—
whose economy was in decline by apartheid’s end—had the great misfortune of having to learn 
to compete in an increasingly globalizing world. In other words, as Alden and le Pere (2004, 
286) note, “the ANC’s idealistic leanings and the realist inclinations of a globalised world 
brought into stark relief a range of tensions and contradictory impulses in implementing foreign 
policy.” Once again, faced with choices between competing values, South Africa sacrificed its 
commitment to human rights to that of economic development, such that—as Alden and le Pere 
put it, “the carefully crafted ethical dimension of foreign policy was supplanted” (286). 
Why is there tension between  economic development and ethical foreign policy? Critics 
accuse South Africa, and Mbeki in particular, of abandoning its socialist redistributive legacy, 
one that hearkened back to the 1955 Freedom Charter, in favor of a neo-liberal emphasis on 
foreign-investment-led growth and open markets (reflected in its economic and fiscal policy 
known as GEAR—Growth, Employment and Redistribution Strategy—of 1996). Thus, while the 
government made noises about fighting the effects of unfettered capitalism, in reality its 
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economic policy more closely resembled a neo-liberal cocktail (Bischoff 2003, 189). Peter Vale 
and Ian Taylor (1999, 631) refer to these critics when they note that “though, it is true, South 
Africa postures a reformist platform that argues for a safeguard against the most negative effects 
of globalization, the ANC has most certainly—to the vocal disappointment of its partners in the 
tripartite alliance and large segments of its traditional constituency—bought into the neo-
liberalist discourse.” A kinder interpretation is that Mbeki’s hands were tied. For many, Mbeki’s 
commitment to redistributive justice was real. He was a key advocate in the global campaign for 
unconditional debt relief to Highly Indebted Poor Countries, 33 of which are in Africa. Bischoff 
(2003, 185-86) argues that Mbeki believed that globalization could incorporate economic rights 
for states, and that there should be a “compensatory movement to globalisation, one that through 
conscious interventions could correct the inability of the market to address issues of peace, 
democracy, health, and prosperity.” Mbeki was forced to abandon this attempt to pursue both 
economic rights and economic growth, however. As a result, Paul Williams argues (2001, 73), 
the government was compelled by the global economic climate to adopt “an eclectic synthesis of 
neo-realist and neo-liberal principles.” As Alden and le Pere (2004, 288) note, the South African 
government will be judged by two criteria: its ability to bring regional peace and security and its 
ability to generate wealth. In both cases, they argue, the government learned quickly that 
“rectitude and idealist leanings were difficult to sustain in a world where realpolitik and 
champions of free market held sway.” They, too, believe that South Africa had no choice but to 
sacrifice socialism in favor of pragmatism. In reference to Mbeki’s dilemma, they note: “a 
world-view driven by ambition to do good and a belief that the coin of idealism still holds value 
in an increasingly Darwinian world suggests an absolutism that might be difficult to hammer out 
on a pragmatic anvil of means and ends” (289). 
A different aspect of the global constraints explanation is highlighted by Bischoff (2003, 
186), who argues that South Africa’s ability to serve as a global leader capable of exercising 
leadership on such “middle power” issues as debt relief, nuclear nonproliferation, and other 
human-rights-related issues, was seriously curtailed by a sharp return to a realist world in the 
aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States and the ensuing global war on 
terror. This became even more true after the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq. The drastically changed 
global political environment, with its renewed focus on issues of “hard power,” meant that “soft 
power” issues that are best championed by middle power countries such as South Africa took an 
immediate backseat. Bischoff (2003, 186) concludes: “the current international system is 
characterized by lurches towards American-led unilateralism and the diminution of 
multilateralism.  This weakening of multilateralism reduces South Africa’s potential for playing 
the role of facilitator and bold reformer.” South Africa’s role as a transformative power in world 
affairs was pulled out from under it by forces beyond its control.  
While South Africa’s post-apartheid leaders may have wanted to pursue an ethical, human 
rights supporting foreign policy, materialist considerations got in the way. The possible paths for 
South African economic development were constrained by neo-liberal globalization, and the 
hyper-realist pots-9/11 world was not conducive to such an ethical foreign policy. Thus, global 
realities constrained possible directions South African foreign policy could take. 
 
Theorizing Post-apartheid Foreign Policy 
This complex picture of South African foreign policy returns us to the theoretical framework 
outlined earlier. Can the four ordering logics we discussed shed light on the paradoxes which 
appear in South Africa’s policies over the last 15 years? Table 1 indicates the behavior predicted 
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by the various ordering logics as well as actual behavior on the part of South Africa. As we have 
discussed, there has been a general expectation that South Africa would put human rights front 
and center in its foreign policy, an expectation fostered by numerous statements by the 
government of South Africa and various South African leaders. Yet, at first glance, we seem to 
be significantly let down by logic-of-appropriateness explanations. South Africa has been a 
significant player in developing norms and institutions that would further the cause of human 
rights. At the African Union it was a driving force behind the peer review mechanism and the 
policy on humanitarian intervention, and it also sought and won a seat on the UN Human Rights 
Council. Yet it failed to follow through on these promising beginnings, blocking concrete action 
in these new institutions. Thus, while, the logic of appropriateness might explain South Africa’s 
initial push to develop human rights institutions, it fails to explain why it did not use these 
institutions to their potential and, in fact, impeded their effectiveness, as well as violating a key 
human rights norm, refugees’ right not to be forcibly returned to a country where they face 
persecution (nonrefoulement). 
Logic-of-consequences arguments might, at least superficially, shed better light on South 
Africa’s foreign policy conduct. The neo-realist wing of rationalist arguments might predict that 
it would seek out important positions in international bodies (which it has), not to pursue human 
rights policies but rather to pursue prestige and power. Neo-liberal rationalism would also predict 
a state’s pursuit of multilateralism, not necessarily only for its own sake but rather to ensure the 
regional and global stability that would be in its interest. Yet, again South Africa did not always 
engage in predicted behavior as it blocked action aimed at addressing crises that affect it directly 
(such as Zimbabwe) and indirectly (such as Darfur). At the same time, it has taken the lead in 
attempting to mediate other crises, such as in the Democratic Republic of Congo. One area 
where it has engaged in expected rationalist behavior is in its pursuit of neo-liberal economic 
policies which, among other things, has led to maltreatment of refugees and asylum seekers, in 
direct contradiction with its international obligations (as well as in contradiction with the debt it 
owes Zimbabwe and other African countries for sheltering those fleeing the apartheid regime). 
Thus, both continental and global constrains constrained its policy choices. 
To more fully understand the paradoxes of South African foreign policy, however, we must 
look to explanations deriving from the logic of arguing, which may shed some light on the 
competing norms and interests found in post-apartheid foreign policy. Nowhere is an internal 
“argument” more evident than in the ideas embedded in the African Renaissance – support for 
democracy, Afrocentrism, and anti-imperialism. While the first element was clearly evident in 
the rhetoric and reality of post-apartheid South Africa (witness Mandela’s failed attempt to put 
pressure on Nigeria), under Mbeki, the other two elements moved to the fore. In the case of 
Zimbabwe, a focus on African solutions to African problems and the instinct to support a fellow 
revolutionary who had given great support to the anti-apartheid struggle led to a situation where 
two normative elements of the new South African ideology shoved the third – and some might 
argue, more foundational – aside. In this particular argument, democracy – and ethical foreign 
policy – was eclipsed by two other very powerful normative currents. With regard to its overall 
performance internationally in supporting human rights, again human rights lost out to Afro-
centrism and anti-imperialism as South Africa refused to use its time on the UN Security Council 
to condemn a variety of human rights abuses around the world. Acting more like a protest and 
solidarist movement than a governing party, the ANC allowed the “anti” elements of the African 
Renaissance (anti-imperialism, anti-Westernism, etc.) to overcome the more positive elements. 
In the AU, while originally supporting very significant human-rights-protecting ideas, such as 
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the peer review mechanism and humanitarian intervention, the African solidarity elements 
prevented it from being more vocal in condemning human-rights-abusing governments in 
Zimbabwe and elsewhere. And paradoxically, South Africa has, at times, supported AU policy 
on the ICC and President Bashir, while defying it at other times. Thus, the competing ideologies 
embedded within the African Renaissance helped (along with domestic ideas) to create ethical 
expectations for South African foreign policy while also pulling in the opposite direction, 
frequently leading to what many would see as disappointing policy outcomes. 
While each of the aforementioned logics may explain parts of the South African foreign 
policy paradoxes, none can explain everything. We thus move to the last ordering logic outlined 
in Table 1 – concurrence. A mixture of both normative and traditional self-interest forces seems 
to have played out in the development of foreign policy, pushing in different directions. As we 
have seen, post-apartheid South Africa seemed reborn as a human rights norm entrepreneur, as 
evidence by its actions in connection with the AU and Nigeria, for example. Yet, more 
traditional interests, in particular economic ones, as well as a desire to take its place as a global 
middle power (without threatening its neighbors with perceptions of hegemony) led it to 
moderate some of its positions and take other actions, such as those relating to refugees and other 
migrants. Normative positions, including Afrocentrism and anti-imperialism pointed, in a 
number of instances, in the same direction as rationalist theories might suggest – i.e., away from 
human rights. How does this fit within our framework? Does it indicate concurrence with a twist 
– norms and interests acting together, against other norms? We should not be surprised that this 
may happen at times. This highlights a significant issue with regard to our theorizing and, in 
particular, the framing of state action within well-defined metatheoretical perspectives. Real life 
is always more messy than the ideal types we create to describe and explain real life. However, 
we hope our discussion sheds some light on the apparent paradoxes of South African post-
apartheid foreign policy, highlighting a continuing struggle between acting like a “normal” state 
and an exceptional one, as well as a struggle to define the terms of that exceptionalism. 
 
Conclusion 
The end of apartheid and the coming into power of the ANC in South Africa represented one of 
the most important victories for the modern global human rights movement. The way the victory 
occurred was exceptional and this history seemed to presage exceptional things for the post-
apartheid South African state. These expectations were further raised by South African leaders 
themselves when they declared that South Africa would use its newfound international status to 
support human rights around the world in the same way that the world had supported the human 
rights struggles of the black majority in South Africa. Such hopes were quickly dashed, however, 
as time and again South Africa disappointed many around the world (and, one might argue, 
itself) by failing to follow through on these affirmative commitments. 
In the post-apartheid era South Africa has struggled to define its identity and its interests, 
arguing internally about its priorities and vision – about whether to live up to Nelson Mandela’s 
and the world’s expectations of putting human rights at the center of its foreign policy, and thus 
to act as an exceptional state, or whether to act as a more ordinary state and pursue policies based 
on traditional state interests. More fundamentally perhaps, South Africa has been engaged in a 
struggle not between ideas and interests (although this has certainly played a role) but rather 
between competing ideas. Very quickly the norms embodied in Mbeki’s African Renaissance 
came into conflict with each other, with African unity and anti-imperialism (reflecting their roots 
in the anti-apartheid struggle) frequently winning out over democracy and human rights (which 
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are similarly rooted in the anti-apartheid struggle). In theoretical terms, while there has obviously 
been a conflict between ideas and interests, the question of which ideas have been seen as most 
salient – which appropriate behavior and responsibility to whom – has dominated South Africa’s 
quest to define itself. Is it exceptional or is it ordinary? Does it identify with Western liberal 
states or is it “African” and anti-imperialist at its core? Can it be both, as Mbeki long implied it 
could? Such questions will likely continue to bedevil South Africa even as the world continues to 
expect it to do great things. While they may no longer be surprised, observers may well continue 
to be dismayed, if South Africa stubbornly – and perhaps understandably – continues to defy 
expectations created for it and by it. 
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TABLE 1: Competing Theoretical Explanations of South African Foreign Policy 
 
Ordering Logic Expected Policies Actual Policies 
Logic of Consequences Neo-realist/Neo-liberal , with a focus on 
economic development, regional and global 
power, and multilateralism 
Restriction/return of refugees to protect 
economic development; 
Participation in multilateral bodies, but 
not leadership 
Logic of Appropriateness Human rights placed at core of foreign policy, 
such as exercise of regional/global leadership, 
condemnation of human-rights-abusing 
regimes, support for robust human rights 
action, and admission of refugees  
Development of African Union peer 
review mechanism and policy on 
humanitarian intervention; 
Sought membership on Human Rights 
Council; 
Support for African Union and UN 
generally, but no trailblazing leadership 
Logic of Arguing Those consistent with African Renaissance 
tenets of  support for democracy, 
Afrocentrism, and anti-imperialism 
Support for African rights abusing 
leaders; 
Refusal to condemn third world leaders 
at UN (on Security Council  and 
Human Rights Commission); 
paradoxical policy on the ICC and 
Bashir 
Concurrent logics A mix of policies, with no overarching logic 
or consistency 
 
An initial push for human rights, then 
pulling away; 
Norm/institution building (African 
Union, Human Rights Commission), 
but no follow through; 
Affirmative statements but no policy 
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well as the anonymous reviewer for providing helpful feedback. 
2
 This was not only the belief of ANC elites. Opinion polls also indicated widespread popular 
support for a human-rights based foreign policy: “Two-thirds to three-quarters of South African 
mass respondents are very concerned about human rights abuses in other countries… and want 
the government to do something about it. This seems to be such an important issue for the 
majority that more citizens strongly want South Africa to be known as a defender of human 
rights than strongly want it to be known as the leader of southern Africa” (Nel, Taylor, and van 
der Westhuizen 2000, 58). 
3
 This description of South Africa would seem to be in accordance with Nel, Taylor and 
Westhuizen’s description of middle powers of the South. They argue, among things, that such 
states, are reformist rather than transformative, may sometimes oppose the hegemon – although 
they will only be successful in their opposition if the issue at stake is not a core interest for the 
hegemon – will likely aspire to, and indeed may hold, significant roles in multilateral institutions 
– at least partly because they provide opportunities for leading Southern coalitions against the 
hegemon – and are regionally dominant (Nel, et al 2000, 46-7). 
4
 South Africa’s desire to stand firm with its African brothers does not stem solely from a sense 
of solidarity in the face of outside condemnation, however. It is also results from a desire not to 
be itself isolated by other African countries, a lesson it learned the hard way in Nigeria. In 1996, 
during his first Commonwealth Conference as president, Nelson Mandela called for sanctions to 
be imposed on Nigeria’s authoritarian Abacha regime. Nigeria was suspended by the 
Conference, but Mandela pressed for more isolation of the Nigerian government, calling for 
diplomatic isolation, which he led by withdrawing the South African High Commissioner. He 
also called on Western states to boycott Nigerian oil and called a meeting of SADC to discuss 
ways to coordinate pressure, only to be roundly denounced by other African leaders there. As 
Barber notes, African states saw Nigeria not as a human-rights-abusing state, but as a continental 
leader that had supported liberation struggles. Indeed, “they accused Mandela of breaking 
African Unity” (Barber 2005, 1084).  The lesson was clearly taken to heart, and South Africa 
was brought back into line: in 2001, when having to justify Mbeki’s policy of quiet diplomacy in 
Zimbabwe, a senior ANC member stated that “South Africa would not repeat Mandela’s ‘terrible 
mistake’ when he acted as a ‘bully’ against the Nigerian dictatorship and ‘everyone stood aside 
and we were isolated.’” Nathan (2005, 367). The “Nigerian debacle” (as Bischoff calls it) clearly 
stung South Africa and seems to have tempered its willingness to act forcefully as a leader in 
condemning human rights violations on the African continent. 
